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Abstract
This paper reviews the claims of several main-stream candidates to
be the foundations of mathematics, including set theory. The review
concludes that at this level of mathematical knowledge it would be
very unreasonable to settle with any one of these foundations and
that the only reasonable choice is a pluralist one. 1
1 Introduction
Set theory is often cited as the foundations of mathematics. In this paper
we review the history of that claim, argue that the other known foundations
such as category theory and univalent foundations have the same but not
larger right to exists, and conclude that the only choice which agrees with
the mathematical practice of today is to take a pluralist view of the matter
and accept all these as foundations of an interesting part of mathematics,
each in its own right. We also lead the reader through the history of what
the foundations of mathematics has actually meant in recent years, moving
from the ontological to an epistemic point of view.
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2 A bit of history of set-theoretic foundations
Set theory started as a purely mathematical subject, brought into life by
George Cantor. Usually the birth of set theory is traced back to his 1874
paper [6], in which Cantor shows that there are at least two sizes of infinity
and derives Liouville’s theorem which states that there are infinitely many
transcendantal numbers. Although, initially, Cantor’s work was oriented
more towards mathematics than logic, his view of mathematics was hugely
influenced by that of Richard Dedekind who was working much more in an
abstract logic approach. It is the meeting between Cantor and Dedekind
in 1872 in Switzerland that should really be considered as the birth of the
subject of set theory, that curious mixture of logic and mathematics that
has formed it as a subject unto itself. As a result of the initial meeting with
Dedekind, Cantor started looking into sets of uniqueness in the theory of
trigonometric series, and this is where the idea of a set as a collection of
objects satisfying some fixed property came from. In fact, there are even
earlier mentions of a similar idea, since Bernard Bolzano considered in 1847
(published posthumously in [4]) the concept of a set as “an embodiment of
the idea or concept which we conceive when we regard the arrangement of
its parts as a matter of indifference” and worked on infinite sets, defending
the idea of their existence and proving their characterization as sets that can
be put in a bijective correspondence with a proper subset of themselves.
Cantor was dealing with what we today call na¨ıve set theory, that is a
theory without axiomatisation, where objects are taken as intuitively clear.
For example, it was taken as evident that any mathematical object was a
set, and indeed the ones that appeared in the practice of the time certainly
could have been seen as sets. This is probably what mathematicians back
then would have meant by the foundation of mathematics. However, para-
doxes in na¨ıve set theory started appearing as early as in 1897, when Cesare
Burali-Forti [5] published work which, when some inaccuracies are corrected,
shows that there is no set of all ordinal numbers. Some, not entirely verifiable
claims, state that Cantor had discovered the same paradox in 1895. Yet, the
inability to formulate arbitrary mathematical objects as sets was made fully
transparent to mathematicians only in 1902 when Bertrand Russell proved
(in a letter to Frege, [25]) that the set U of all sets cannot exist, as the set
{B ∈ U : B /∈ B} yields a contradiction. (It is less well known that Ernst
Zermelo independently discovered this paradox, also in 1902 (see [23])). This
was a bit of an embarrassing situation to say the least, since by 1902 the role
of set theory in the foundations of mathematics has already been established
and accepted. In spite of the resistance of mathematicians such as Leopold
Kroenecker, now considered as the founder of constructivist mathematics,
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set theory had become widespread, due to the utility of its concepts, its om-
nipresence in mathematical proofs, and the inviting concept of the “infinity
of infinities” (the “Cantor’s paradise” of Hilbert) resulting from the iterative
use of the power set operation. The contemporary appreciation of set theory
can be seen by the article on set theory in Klein’s encyclopedia [26]. After
Russell, it was immediately realised that paradoxes in set theory were coming
from the lack of proper axioms. Many, including Zermelo, started working
on the axiomatisation of set theory. In 1908, he published his results [30]
with a resolution of the Russell paradox through the use of the restricted
rather than full comprehension. In 1922, Adolf Fraenkel and in 1923 Thoralf
Skolem independently improved Zermelo’s axiom system (see the book [10],
pg. 22 for the history and further references). The resulting axioms system
of axioms in the first order logic, called Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms (ZF), is
now the most commonly used system for axiomatic set theory. It is usually
used in conjunction with the Axiom of Choice, and known as ZFC. In spite
of some historical controversy about the acceptance of the Axiom of Choice,
since it is known from the work of Go¨del in [13] that the consistency of ZF
implies that of ZFC, it is common practice to accept ZFC as the axiomati-
sation of set theory. In this article we shall not discuss axiomatisations not
related to ZFC, of which there are several. A celebrated part of the history
of ZFC is that it does not resolve the continuum problem, as shown by Paul
Cohen in 1963, see [7].
3 Conceptions of set theory
To understand the place of set theory in the foundations at this moment, it
is instructive to discuss the image that this subject presents both from the
inside and the outside of its practice. It seems to be the case that set theory
has quite a different image for those that practice it and for those who observe
it. The observers of this subject consist of other logicians, mathematicians
and philosophers, as well as rather frequent casual observers fascinated by the
told and untold promises of the subject. Which other subject promises many
versions of infinity, the basis for the whole of mathematics and then some
unsolvable problems? Let us go into these conceptions a bit more seriously,
to allow us to ask the question that we wish to address in the first place: what
is the real role of set theory in the foundations of mathematics today? We
also invite the reader to reflect on what one should mean by “the foundations
of mathematics”. Should it be ontological or epistemic? We shall give our
answer in Section §5.
For the outsider, set theory tends to be the subject axiomatised by ZFC.
3
Anectdotal evidence from working mathematicians suggests that this axiom
system is viewed as more than sufficient for what mathematics needs. While
the axiom of choice or the continuum hypothesis might still excite some oc-
casional discussion, mathematicians in most areas seem to happily accept
the “sufficiency” of ZFC and with somewhat less assurance, also its “neces-
sity”. It might be worth mentioning that among the non-practioners, there
are also proponents of ZFC2, the ZFC axiomatisation in full second order
logic. Some philosophers, for example Stewart Shapiro (see [27]) are inter-
ested in this system as it offers certain categoricity. Namely, Zermelo proved
in [31] that the only models of this system are of the form Vκ for a strongly
inaccessible cardinal κ. This result is interesting from various points of view,
but not very relevant to the questions of independence in set theory since, for
example, ZFC2 does not settle the continuum problem any more than ZFC
does. (This is the case because by the results of Azriel Le´vy and Robert
Solovay[18] one can change the universe of set theory and change the values
of the continuum function, while keeping the same cardinal κ inaccessible.)
Given that there is no gain on the important question of independence, set
theorists themselves do not like ZFC2 because it takes away a large chunk
of the subject which is based on the soundeness, completeness (and conse-
quently compactness) of the first order logic. Namely, taken together, these
properties say that for any set Σ of sentences of the first order logic, |= Σ iff
` Σ, that is all sentences in Σ are true in every model iff there is no proof
of contradiction from Σ. Therefore to prove the consistency of a theory T ,
such as say ZFC+¬CH, it suffices to find a model for it. A rather extensive
discussion of these issues can be found in [16].
At any rate, in the first order or the second order axiomatisation, or even
without any axiomatisation, set theory is considered important in founda-
tions of mathematics because many of the classical notions are axiomatized
by the theory and can be found in the cumulative hierarchy of sets. Let us
also recall that Hilbert considered that all mathematics can be formulated
in (na¨ıve) set theory, which certainly hammered in the place of set theory in
the foundations. Extensions of ZFC by axioms with strictly higher consis-
tency strength2 are rarely considered outside of the subject itself, although we
should mention the recent philosophical work by Giorgio Venturi [28] which
argues for the acceptance of Forcing Axioms (see below for more discussion
and [8] for a survey). Not to forget the work of Penelope Maddy, who has
dedicated a large part of her work to explaining the methods that set theo-
rists use in agreeing on axioms, especially those that go beyond ZFC. Or the
2a theory T is said to be of a strictly higher consistency strength than a theory T ′ if
from the consistency of T we can conclude the consistency of T ′, but not vice versa
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work of Peter Koellner. But all of these philosophers are so much specialisists
in set theory that for the purpose of this article and much wider than that,
they certainly count as insiders of set theory rather than the outsiders.
Not entering into more examples that form the outside image of set theory,
probably the most important point to note here is that the outside view of set
theory often takes it for granted that the set theorists believe in one universe
of set theory, as much as mathematicians believe in one mathematics, and
that set theorists are in search of the right axioms to describe that universe.
So, in this view, the fact that for example CH is independent of ZFC would
mean that the “right” axiomatisation of set theory would extend ZFC into
something that would resolve CH. And this outsider is not entirely wrong,
Go¨del himself considered that his incompleteness theorems only show that
the ZFC system is too weak to answer those questions, and therefore one
should search for new axioms that once added to ZFC would answer them.
The search for new axioms has been known as Go¨del’s Program, see [1]. Yet,
the search for the new axioms does not imply the belief in one universe.
While the insider also accepts the ZFC axioms, that is their “necessity”,
it is clear to a set theorist that ZFC is insufficient. There is a universal
belief in the consistency of large cardinal axioms and ZFC is viewed simply
as a minimum of what one should consider as a reasonable system. Not only
are the large cardinals needed for set theory but they are also known to be
needed for some seemingly innocent statements about number theory. For
example, Harvey Friedman [11] developed the Boolean relation theory, which
demonstrates the necessity of large cardinals for deriving certain propositions
considered “concrete”. Friedman and others view this as an obvious reason
for a working mathematician to accept large cardinals. Moving on from the
large cardinals and their widespread acceptance, we also claim that in set
theory there is no belief in the single universe of the axioms. That is, even
if the “right” axioms were to be found, there is no reason to hope that they
would be categorical. Moreover, moving rather far from the foundational
issues, as much as set theorists have understood the privileged position of the
subject as regards to its ability to formulate mathematics, many in general
consider that the subject of foundations is not worth pursuing and are much
more interested in the mathematics of infinity. Most have the view that,
certainly, the search for the unique perfect foundations of mathematics is
closed since Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems [12]. Since even the continuum
problem is independent, most set theorists have long moved the emphasis of
the subject somewhere else than the axioms, even if Go¨del himself did not.
The philosophical views one can read or, more often, read between the
lines, in the work of set theory today include the following:“Given the incom-
pleteness, it is better to concentrate on what is possible to do in ZFC and
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understand what is not by studying independence” (adopted by Saharon
Shelah, some from his school and some others). The more persistent on
the resolution of the continuum problem is the view of the California school
that continues the Go¨del program, now most prominently presented by Hugh
Woodin. They do believe that we should find new axioms to complete ZFC,
at least to the extent of resolving the continuum problem. Certainly one such
axiom is that all sets are constructible (‘V = L’). However, there is little
enthusiasm among the practioners to accept it as an axiom, since it gives
a very restrictive view of the set-theoretic universe, excluding for example
the notion of measurable cardinals and therefore most of the large cardinals,
which are considered to be the backbone in modern set theory as discussed
above. Another set of statements are the so called Forcing Axioms, such as
MA, PFA and others. A set-theoretic universe in which such a statement
holds is saturated under certain forcing constructions. This means that the
universe itself already contains some of the objects that in other universes
would have to be added by forcing. In most people’s mind this does not
make for a natural axiom to add to ZFC. Certain among the forcing axioms,
such as PFA, do settle the value of the continuum (to be ℵ2), so some set-
theorists, hold that such a statement could be an actual axiom. To mention
some names, perhaps Menachem Magidor holds this view to a certain ex-
tent, as expressed in private conversations, but there is no written evidence
of this. But really, to see how much set theorists do not take a position on
any of these axioms, consider the Set Theory entry for [1], by Joan Bagaria.
It says: “A central theme of set theory is thus the search and classification
of new axioms. These fall currently into two main types: the axioms of large
cardinals and the forcing axioms.”The mathematical properties of these ax-
ioms are then explained in two separate sections. That is the end. There is
no philosophical conclusion or a choice made as to what and if any of these
statements are indeed axioms. The author does not take sides.
Bagaria’s position is very representative of the modern set theorist. We
do not feel that we know enough in order to take sides. Moreover, some
of us do not believe that there ever will be a side to be taken. Whatever
flavour of set theory we do, there is one common ground to all working
set-theorists at the moment. We accept that there are many universes of
the axioms of ZFC, which all have different properties and satisfy various
additional statements or axioms. None of them is ultimate. This, evidently
pluralist, view is certainly the only reasonable one at the moment, given the
fact that mathematical evidence does not support the choice of any of these
universes over any other ones. Therefore, not only the working set theorists of
today do not see themselves as providing the unique ontological foundation
of mathematics, but they do not believe in such a unique foundation and
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do not claim it even for their own subject. I was asked if this means that
practicing set theorists are no longer looking for the ultimate truth in the
form of one universe or model of set theory. I think that this is the case.
This is best expressed in the Multiverse View formulated by Joel Hamkins
[14]. If the classical position, referred to by Hamkins as the Universe View,
asserts that there is a unique background set-theoretic context or universe
in which all our mathematical activity takes place, then the Multiverse View
is exactly the pluralist opposite, asserting that there is no single universe
but many and that only in understanding their multitude do we understand
the actual nature of set theory. The Multiverse View accepts any universe
consistent with ZFC.
4 Other Foundations
In addition to the set-theoretic view which we explained in the above, there
have been several other approaches to foundations of mathematics. We shall
briefly discuss two successful approaches: category theory and the, recently
developed, univalent foundations.
ZFC set theory cannot formalise proper classes, such as the class of all
sets, as seen by the Russell paradox. In other words, there are objects in
mathematics, ‘collections’ which are not sets. Category theory proposes a
formalization of such objects in terms of categories and their morphisms.
Category theory is very appropriate for the study of mathematical objects
by their abstract properties and has met with a large degree of success in
subjects such as algebraic geometry.3
There has been quite a bit of heated discussion on the subject of the
preference for sets or for categories. For example, Saunders Mac Lane in
[19] expresses the view that set-theoretical foundations are inappropriate for
mathematics as practised and proposes category theory as an alternative.
William Lawvere states in [17]: ‘In the mathematical development of recent
decades one sees clearly the rise of the conviction that the relevant proper-
ties of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of their
abstract structure rather than in terms of the elements which the objects
were thought to be made of. The question thus naturally arises whether one
can give a foundation for mathematics which expresses wholeheartedly this
conviction concerning what mathematics is about and in particular in which
classes and membership do not play any role”. This was part of Lawvere’s
3There are other set theories that do formalise the notion of a proper class, but Russell’s
paradox creeps in in other forms. This point does not change the conclusions here and
discussing it is outside of the scope of the paper;
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work in which he develops the foundations based on the elementary topoi,
a concept that has grown out of his approach to the category of sets. More
recent work on the theory of topoi is by Olivia Caramello who is building a
methodology based on the theory of topoi to unify diverse parts of mathe-
matics and logic. Gerhard Osius [20] gave an two extension ETS(ZF) of the
elementary theory of topoi which is equivalent (by translation) to ZF. In the
other direction, the straightforward set-theoretic foundations for category
theory are inadequate as they, for example do not formalise the Groethen-
dick method of universes. Solomon Feferman then in [9] argues that even
an unrestricted category needed for the method of universes can be given
foundations within set theory. So perhaps this justifies the view expressed
by MacLane in the introduction to [9], although Feferman argues against
it, that set-theoretical foundations and categorical foundations are entirely
equivalent, philosophically speaking. Discussion of relative merits of set the-
ory versus category theory continues on the electronic forum FOM, initiated
by H. Friedman. Yet in our opinion, the two foundations are complemen-
tary. For example, iterated forcing which in set theory we consider as an
unquestionable part of the subject, is also used in topos theory and has even
been used in arguments concerning computer sciences (see [3]). Yet, this
does not mean that the open set-theoretic questions about it, such as for
example what can be the cofinality of the first cardinal that fails MA or if
there is a forcing axiom at the successor of a singular cardinal or if forcing
with the Talagrand algebra adds a random real, seem likely to be solved
by translations to the topos theory, or that one can formulate the concrete
questions such as these ones in a natural way using the topoi. Vice versa,
one would indeed be missing a mathematical opportunity if one would refuse
to use categorical language to express the unifying results and conjectures
such as the ones proposed by the Langlands programme.
A very recent, exciting, event in the foundations of mathematics is the
discovery by Vladimir Voevodsky in [29] of univalent foundations. These
are foundations for constructive mathematics and they have brought about
a discovery of connection between the homology theory and the theory of
types. Here the first order logic is replaced by the theory of dependent
types. In this approach, it is the deduction system that changes, not just
the axioms or the basic objects. This approach allows us, by using proof
assistants such as Coq or Agda to formalise an important part of modern
mathematics and to verify proofs of certain, quite involved, theorems, such
as the Four Colour Theorem and the Feit-Thompson (Odd Order) Theorem.
An important difference between the dependent type theory approach and
the one offered by classical logic is the treatment of equality. In traditional
foundations, equality carries no information beyond its truth-value: if two
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things are equal, they are equal in exactly one way. So, the equality is just
a two-place predicate on some set. In dependent type theory, equalities can
carry information: two objects may be equal in multiple ways. The basic
objects, which are called types, are equipped with an operation resembling a
morphism and two are considered the same if there is a morphism between
them. This type of equality conforms with the intuition that in mathematics
we often consider objects that are equivalent as actually being equal. The
Univalence Axiom formalises this practice, stating that two types are equal iff
they are equal as the elements of the universe, which is a type of types. This
gives for free many theorems stating that certain properties are preserved
under equivalence, which otherwise need to be proved each time for each new
construction. The same questions that one can ask in classical foundations
can be asked in univalent foundations, starting from what we mean exactly
by the foundations of mathematics. For example, Voevodsky’s initial view
follows a platonist tradition, while Steve Awodey [2] argues for a structuralist
point of view, based on the idea that the isomorphic objects are considered to
be identical. Many developments in the univalent foundations are described
in the collective HoTT book [22].
The univalent foundations with the axiom of univalence are consistent
modulo the consistency of ZFC and the existence of two inaccessible car-
dinals (due to Voevodtsky), as reported in a paper by Chris Kapulkin and
Peter Lefanu Lumsdaine [15]). Other models of univalence are now known,
using less power of the axioms, notably the cubical sets model which gives
a computational interpretation of the univalence axiom. In fact a very fine
analysis the correspondance between the weak subsystems of univalence and
weak subsystems of ZFC is carried out in a recent, not yet published work,
by Ulrik Buchholtz.
Some discussion has been going on as to the relationship between the set-
theoretic foundations and the univalent foundations. Egbert Rijke and Bas
Spitters in [24] show that sets in homotopy type theory form a ΠW -pretopos,
and under certain additional assumptions, even a topos of sets. This shows
in some sense that set theory is a special case of the homotopy type theory.
This is a step in the programme of rendering constructive and verifiable
the arguments that are obtained by classical set-theoretic foundations, or
even all of mathematics. The programme is now known as the formalization
of mathematics. Yet, without entering into details of how far exactly this
programme has reached, as the authors of [24] state in the conclusion of the
paper, this is still a rather far away goal, but, as seen by further papers, also
a continuing area of research.
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5 What is the Foundation, a pluralist answer
The above short excursion in to the present state of knowledge about the
main-stream candidates to the foundations of mathematics leaves little doubt
as to what foundations to take for mathematics. It would be very unrea-
sonable at this point of our knowledge to take any particular one of these
candidates as foundations of all of mathematics. They each, including set
theory, have their limits, and have their points of breakthrough. They are all
basically equiconsistent, differing from each other over a few large cardinals,
and moreover, they can be studied more locally to obtain a finer distinction
between their subtheories, with respect to consistency.
There is even a question to be asked, is it really that obvious that math-
ematics should have an ontological foundation? The fact that we can ax-
iomatise certain parts of mathematics, starting with Euclidean geometry,
has traditionally been taken as a proof-of-concept idea for axiomatisation of
all of mathematics and a guideline for an ontological foundation. But why
should this really be so? Perhaps the time has come in the foundations of
mathematics to speak differently than the Greek ’gods of mathematics’, in
the sense of moving away of the Euclidean view of axiomatisation (or to be
more precise, the view of axiomatisation traditionally ascribed to Euclid, as
there is some question as to whether he took this view himself, see [21]). Just
as Hamkins convincingly argues in [14] that one should take an ultimately
pluralist view of set theoretic universes, we feel that mathematical practice
and our state of knowledge do not justify a choice of any particular foun-
dation as the unique one. Such a choice in each instance leads to a loss of
a considerable part of mathematics that is invisible to the foundations cho-
sen. Foundations of mathematics the way envisioned since the time of the
ancient Greeks leave us with the image of mathematics as a building based
on these foundations. However, modern practice suggests that mathematics
is more like a complex interconnected city with many buildings and many
foundations.
This represents a shift in the use of the word ‘foundation’ from the on-
tological view of the 20th century philosophers of mathematics who were
looking for the truth or the essence of mathematics. The more recent view
is more epistemic, since the practicing mathematician is more after under-
standing than after ‘knowledge’. 4 This shift is probably what distinguishes
the philosophy of mathematics from that more recent subject which some
would call the philosophy of mathematical practice.
4We thank the referee for formulating the last two sentences, which describe exactly
the point discussed.
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We should also like to point out that this pluralist view of foundations of
mathematics does not contradict non-pluralists views of what mathematics
is itself. In particular, it does not contradict a platonist view of mathematics
as a unique and deterministically defined object. The point is not if there
is a uniquely defined mathematics, but whether our ability to describe it is
uniquely defined. The former question is a question of belief, intuition and
to some extent philosophy. The latter one is a question of mathematical
practice and its philosophy, which must by definition be based on what we
know rather than on what we believe to be true.
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